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INTRODUCTION
Google recently asserted that email “users have no ‘reasonable
expectation’ of privacy.”1 Headlines like this fueled outrage when the
advocacy group Consumer Watchdog posted Google’s motion to
dismiss a class action lawsuit online.2 This statement has been called
“a stunning admission,”3 but how surprising is it? In reality, Google’s
statement reflects well-established law, which only fairly recently
started to receive judicial criticism.4 Law enforcement agencies can
often gain access to email information with little more than a
subpoena.5 This ease of access may surprise many Americans who
use email as their primary means of communication. The rapid
and exponential growth of the Internet and technology over the
past decade has made it easy to communicate with others around
the world. However, these advantages have revealed a host of
privacy issues.
In the 1980s, manufacturers such as IBM and Apple began
marketing more affordable computer systems, which allowed greater
1. Dominic Rushe, Google: Don’t Expect Privacy When Sending to Gmail, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/14/googlegmail-users-privacy-email-lawsuit (reporting that Google stated, in a motion to
dismiss, that “all users of email” do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their email communications).
2. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 19, 25–26, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK
(N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013), 2013 WL 3297861, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog
.org/resources/googlemotion061313.pdf; John M. Simpson, Google Tells Court You
Cannot Expect Privacy When Sending Messages to Gmail—People Who Care About Privacy
Should Not Use Service, Consumer Watchdog Says, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/google-tells-court-you-cannot-expect
-privacy-when-sending-messages-gmail-people-who-care; see also Rushe, supra note 1.
3. Simpson, supra note 2 (emphasis added) (“Google has finally admitted they
don’t respect privacy.”).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(stating that Fourth Amendment protection is “not absolute, and may be
extinguished when a computer user transmits information over the Internet or by email”); United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.P.R. 2007)
(noting that most courts that have addressed Fourth Amendment concerns in the
email context have held that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
email communications). The first federal circuit court to challenge this premise was
the Sixth Circuit in 2007. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir.
2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
5. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 462 (indicating that federal authorities can access
emails sent more than six months prior with only a subpoena); see also Rehberg v.
Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir. 2010) (surveying several circuits that have held
that a person lacks a legitimate privacy expectation in Internet subscriber
information and to and from addresses in emails sent with ISPs).

MEDINA.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

11/2/2013 12:33 PM

269

access to computer technology.6 This increased access spurred the
creation of novel and now widely used methods of communication.
Concerns that the law did not adequately protect the privacy of those
communications prompted Congress to enact the Stored
Communications Act7 (SCA or “the Act”) as part of the broader
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 19868 (EPCA). The SCA
protects communications in three important ways: (1) it provides a
private cause of action against anyone who intentionally “obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access” to certain stored
communications; (2) it regulates when network service providers may
voluntarily disclose customer communications and records; and (3) it
outlines specific rules that govern when state actors may compel
disclosure of stored communications from network service providers.9
The statute was remarkably forward-looking in that it was passed
before Congress could fully grasp the complications of emerging
technology.10 At the time of the statute’s passage, email systems
required users to subscribe to the same email service provider as the
sender to receive messages electronically.11 Moreover, even though
access to technology was increasing, it was still prohibitively expensive
for individuals and generally only available to businesses, academics,
and educational institutions.12 Surprisingly, the SCA has served its
purpose of protecting electronic communications well beyond the
limited technology that existed at the time of its passage.13

6. Timeline of Computer History, COMPUTER HIST. MUSEUM, http://www.computerhistory
.org/timeline (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (noting IBM’s introduction of its first
personal computer in 1981 and Apple’s launch of the first successful mouse-driven
computer with a graphic user interface in 1984).
7. Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012)).
The SCA was included in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which (1) amended the Wiretap Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522; (2) created the Pen Register Act, id. §§ 3121–3127; and (3)
created the Stored Communications Act, id. §§ 2701–2712. Thus, the SCA is
sometimes referred to as the ECPA.
8. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2703 (creating causes of action for intentional
unauthorized access to, or dissemination of, electronic communications).
10. See Security and Surveillance: ECPA, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://www
.cdt.org/issue/wiretap-ecpa (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
11. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986).
12. See id. at 10 (stating that outsourced marketing was provided to “businesses of
all sizes”); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2004) (noting that the first consumer Internet
providers did not emerge until 1990).
13. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1243 (2004) (“The SCA
has weathered intervening technological advances surprisingly well.”).
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However, diverging judicial interpretations regarding the SCA’s
applicability to modern technologies, such as Webmail,14 have created
serious concerns as to the statute’s continued viability. Some courts
interpret the SCA broadly by applying modern conceptions of new
technologies, while others strictly follow the statutory language and
history of the Act and assess new innovations within the confines of
1986 technologies.15 These differing interpretations have created
uncertainty regarding the scope of the SCA. In Jennings v. Jennings,16
for example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina unanimously held
that unauthorized access by any person to emails stored on Yahoo!’s
server did not create a cause of action under the SCA.17 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina’s issuance of three opinions in
Jennings is indicative of the “headaches” courts encounter when
applying the SCA to new technologies.18
This Note argues that Congress needs to update the SCA to ensure
adequate protection of electronic communications. Moreover, it
advances that the ultimate outcome of Jennings was correct, but that
the case’s different opinions have increased the uncertainty of the
SCA’s application. To that extent, this Note proposes crucial
legislative reforms and a simple and consistent approach for courts to
follow and effectuate Congress’s intent.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the
evolution of email technologies, a general description of the SCA,
and its relevant legislative history. Part II explores the unanswered
questions from the statutory text and the inconsistent case law
interpreting the SCA’s scope. Part III sets forth the current legislative
proposals to update the SCA. This Part also proposes much-needed
legislative changes and suggests a simple, consistent scheme that
courts should use to properly effectuate Congress’s intent when
applying the SCA to modern technologies. Finally, Part IV explains
14. See infra text accompanying note 36 (defining “webmail”).
15. Compare, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (concluding that the phrase “electronic communication” encompasses
“transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such
communications”), and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir.
2004) (broadening the definition of electronically transmitted communications to
include messages stored on a web server that have already been received but remain
in storage in case a user needs to download them again), with Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir. 1994) (arguing that
electronically stored communications are no longer in transmission once received).
16. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings
v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
17. Id. at 245.
18. See discussion infra Part II (outlining the trouble courts experience applying
the SCA).
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why the Jennings court was correct in concluding that unauthorized
access to email stored on a remote server does not implicate the SCA.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Email and Its Emerging Technology
Early email systems allowed users to send, transmit, and receive
messages between computer terminals via telephone lines.19
Generally, users could send and receive emails in two ways. First, the
transmission could be sent from computer to computer between
subscribers of the same email company.20 These communications
remained in electronic form.21 Once the sender composed and sent
the email, the message would travel via telephone lines until it
reached the recipient email provider’s server.22 There, the email
would sit on the recipient email provider’s server until requested via a
dial-up modem to connect to the server and download the copy to
the recipient’s personal computer.23
Once the message was
downloaded, it would be deleted from both the sender and recipient
email provider’s servers.24 The second way in which individuals could
send or receive emails occurred when the recipient was not an email
subscriber.25 In this scenario, a composer would send the electronic
message directly to the email company.26 Once the company received
the message, it converted the message to a hard copy and sent it via
traditional mail or courier service.27 In both cases, the email
19. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 47 (1985) [hereinafter
OTA REPORT] (discussing the evolution of electronic written communications),
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99-508/fgit-1985.pdf.
20. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 474 (1985) [hereinafter House ECPA Hearing] (memorandum from
ACLU Project Staff) (detailing the various methods through which electronic mail
can be transmitted); OTA REPORT, supra note 19, at 47–48 (describing the
differences between electronic communication options).
21. OTA REPORT, supra note 19, at 47–48.
22. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986).
23. See id. (stating that the message would be stored on the electronic mail
company’s computer “mail box” until the user called to retrieve it).
24. See S. REP. NO. 113-34, at 2 (2013) (noting that at the time the SCA was
enacted, Congress assumed that most individuals would download emails to their
personal computers and ISPs would subsequently delete any emails stored on their
servers). But see S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (stating that, “to ensure system integrity,”
service providers did retain copies of these communications for about three
months).
25. OTA REPORT, supra note 19, at 46–47 (explaining the use of a courier service
when an email was sent to a non-subscriber recipient).
26. Id. at 48.
27. Id.; see also Erik Sandberg-Diment, When Technology Outpaces Needs: Expense
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company created copies of the message along the way “to ensure
system integrity” and retained those copies for about three months.28
Until the late 1980s, users retrieved their emails under the systems
described above using individual networks sanctioned by the
government and provided by employers or academic institutions.29
Due to the prohibitive cost of storage, service providers maintained at
most a handful of servers to store data.30 Accordingly, permanent
storage of emails was not feasible. Thus, service providers generally
offered two distinct services—email services or outsourced storage
services.31 Due to the expense and limitations of outsourced
storage, use of that service was essentially limited to businesses. 32
Therefore, at least with regard to individual use, technology
revolved around the personal computer. All information and
communications were stored at the system level and could only be
accessed through that point.33
What was prohibitively expensive at the time Congress enacted the
SCA is now commonplace for email users. Today, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), such as Google and Yahoo!, operate data centers

and Lack of Standards Frustrate Users of Electronic Mail and Videotex, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1985, at F13 (detailing new email services that include “a two-hour delivery of letterquality documents to many parts of the country”).
28. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.
29. See Sean Michael Kerner, Why Cloud Is Like Email in the 1980’s,
INTERNETNEWS.COM (May 10, 2011), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article
.php/3933111/Why+Cloud+is+Like+Email+in+the+1980s.htm (stating that until the
late 1980s, email services functioned separately between service providers, were not
connected to the Internet, and required permission from the federal government).
30. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2010) [hereinafter ECPA and Cloud Computing Hearing]
(statement of Kevin Werbach, Associate Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania). In 1988, two years after the SCA was
enacted, the cost of a 1.2 gigabyte (GB) hard drive was $7,799.95. Amiga Product
Guide: Hardware Edition, 3 AMAZING COMPUTING, no. 3, 1988, at 55, 62. This translates
into $15,420.36 in 2013 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (enter
“7,799.95” and “1988,” then select “2013” and the “Calculate” button). Today, a
consumer can purchase a three terabyte hard drive, or 3,000 times more storage, for
only $114.95. WD My Book 3TB External Hard Drive Storage USB 3.0 File Backup and
Storage, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Book-External-Drive-Storage-Backup/dp/
B0041OSQBG/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1379464619&sr=8-2-fkmr0&keywords
=Western+Digital+MyBook+WDBACW0020H (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
31. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1213–14 (detailing different electronic
communications service options utilized at the time the SCA was legislated).
32. See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1207 (2010) (noting that
marketing was targeted at business organizations, not individual consumers).
33. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (“If the intended addressee subscribes to the
service, the message is stored by the company’s computer ‘mail box’ until the
subscriber calls the company to retrieve its mail . . . .”).
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spanning the size of several football fields, and provide an almost
unlimited amount of storage at no cost to the consumer.34 These
expanded capabilities, combined with affordable mobile devices that
provide Internet access, have led many users to use webmail—a cloud
computing service35 that provides a user with the ability to create,
send, access, archive, and organize emails through the Internet.36
Webmail and other cloud computing services have changed the
way most Americans approach email. The personal computer is
no longer important as a means for storing or retrieving emails. 37
For webmail users, the computer or mobile device merely serves as
a conduit to access the remote server—a situation far from the
realm of possibility when Congress enacted the SCA. This stark
change in the way Americans communicate has rendered the SCA
obsolete in many ways. The task of adapting the SCA to the
current—and more advanced—regime of web technology
necessarily falls to the legislature.
B. Congress’s Creation of the SCA
The 1980s represented the beginning of a “revolution” in the
telecommunications infrastructure in the United States that radically
changed the way people and entities communicate with one
another.38
While the sudden boom in technology brought
advantages, it also became clear that the law did not adequately
protect these new and emerging forms of communication.39
34. See ECPA and Cloud Computing Hearing, supra note 30, at 84 (acknowledging
the rapid shift from personal computing to cloud based computing built upon
“massive, multi-billion dollar data centers”).
35. Cloud services are applications for media and data storage that are “hosted
on or run on Internet servers,” allowing the user to run the application and store
data on an ISP’s remote server rather than on a computer. Joanna Stern, What Is the
‘Cloud’?, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/cloudcomputing-storage-explained/story?id=16647561#.UbN6uJW9064.
36. See id. (discussing the expansion of network and information storage since
the ECPA was first legislated).
37. See Maeve Duggan & Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities 2012, P EW I NTERNET
& A M . L IFE P ROJECT 2, 7 (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media
//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf (showing that 50% of the 85%
of adults with cell phones in the United States use their mobile devices to check email);
Jay Garmon, What Is My Gmail Account Really Worth?, BACKUPIFY (July 25, 2012), http://
blog.backupify.com/2012/07/25/what-is-my-gmail-account-really-worth (indicating
that the average Gmail account contains 17,640 messages and the average Gmail user
adds about 1.4 megabytes (MB) of storage a day, the same amount of data that fit on
a floppy disk).
38. House ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 48 (statement of Fred W. Weingarten,
Program Manager, Communication and Technologies Program, Office of
Technology Assessment) (tracing the consumer shift in telecommunications towards
a new paradigm of media, communication, and innovative use of concepts and data).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 18 (1986) (“[T]he same technologies that hold
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Congress realized that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 196840 (Wiretap Act) and the Fourth
Amendment41the two available sources of privacy protection for
electronic communicationsdid not cover certain new forms of
these communications.
The Wiretap Act only provided for protection for voice
communications sent via common carriers.42
Thus, non-aural
communications such as video, text, digital, and other electronic
communications did not warrant protection under the Wiretap Act.43
Moreover, stored communications did not fall within the parameters
of the Wiretap Act.44
Similarly, stored communications were left susceptible to discovery
under the Fourth Amendment.
An individual must have a
“reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy in the information
sought to qualify for Fourth Amendment protection.45 Whether
someone possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy is determined
by the two-pronged analysis from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States.46 This test, known as the Katz test, incorporates
both subjective and objective elements by requiring that an
individual’s conduct reflect “an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy” and that the expectation be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”47 Due to the difficulty of proving or
disproving an individual’s subjective expectations, the objective
prong of the Katz test—whether society recognizes the individual’s
subjective
expectation
as
reasonable—is
often
outcome

such promise for the future also enhance the risk that our communications will be
intercepted by either private parties or the government.”); OTA REPORT, supra note
19, at 48 (revealing that “[t]he emergence of electronic mail has raised a
number of policy issues,” including questions about market structure and
regulation, such as whether regulations for common courier systems and private
systems should be the same).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . but upon probable cause . . . .”).
42. Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment
Protections for Email, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 814 (2012).
43. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17.
44. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17 (“This statutory framework appears to leave
unprotected an important sector of the new communications technologies.”).
45. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 180–81 (1984).
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
47. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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determinative.48 Thus, Fourth Amendment protection changes as
societal expectations evolve.49
Employing the Katz test, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that individuals do not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information transmitted to a third party.50 This third-party doctrine
has grave implications for the privacy of any information transmitted
electronically, as many courts have used it to hold that the contents of
email communications are not protected under the Fourth
Amendment.51 Consistent with Katz’s context-based analysis, courts
rely on a number of different factors to determine whether the
contents of emails are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
For example, some courts rely on the terms of service agreements or
privacy policies associated with a user’s account.52 Additionally,
48. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC E VIDENCE IN C RIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 116
(2009) [hereinafter DOJ M ANUAL ], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal
/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
49. Compare Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(finding that helicopter surveillance of individual’s property was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment because “no intimate details” of the property were revealed
and the officers were flying in public airspace), and Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial photograph of a chemical company’s
industrial complex did not violate the Fourth Amendment in part because the
photograph was taken using a conventional commercial camera widely available to
the public, and because its “open areas” were comparable to an open field, which is
generally not covered by the Fourth Amendment), with Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34–35 & n.2 (2001) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in “the
relative heat of various rooms in the home” revealed by a thermal imaging device in
part because thermal imaging is not widely available to the public).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the
petitioner had no expectation of privacy in the telephone number he dialed because,
by using his phone, he “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and . . . [thereby] assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to police the numbers he dialed”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in records
provided to an accountant).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that email is not protected by the Fourth Amendment because, “[w]hile
it is clear to this court that Congress intended to create a statutory expectation of
privacy in email files, it is less clear that an analogous expectation of privacy derives
from the Constitution”); In re Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail, 665 F.
Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
email contents because “defendants voluntarily conveyed to the ISPs and exposed to
the ISP’s employees in the ordinary course of business the contents of their emails”).
52. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 895, 906 (9th
Cir. 2008) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police sergeant’s text
messages based on the police department’s “informal policy that the text messages
would not be audited”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619 (2010); Biby v. Bd. of Regents, 419 F.3d 845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a university employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in email where
university policy stated that computer files and emails may be searched in response
to litigation discovery requests).
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courts disagree on whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is
relinquished once the intended recipient receives the email.53 The
uncertainty of this fact-based approach makes the status of email
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence impossible to predict.
Congress was concerned that the legal uncertainty created by the
inadequacies of the Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment with
respect to electronic communications would lead to the “erosion of a
precious [Fourth Amendment] right” and severely inhibit the
progress of telecommunications technology.54 To address these
concerns, Congress sought to fill the gap left open by the Wiretap Act
and Fourth Amendment.55 The result was the SCA, a narrowly
tailored and complex statute providing Fourth Amendment-like
protections to certain electronic communications modeled on early
computer networks.56 Congress proceeded cautiously and sought a
careful balance between three important principles: (1) the public’s
right to privacy; (2) society’s interest in expanding and benefitting
from continued technological progress; and (3) the legitimate needs
of law enforcement.57 Consequently, the SCA protects certain
electronic communications but also preserves avenues for law
enforcement to effectively conduct criminal investigations.58
53. Compare United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)
(analogizing email to postal mail, which loses its reasonable expectation of privacy
upon delivery of the letter, and holding that the Fourth Amendment does not afford
protection to “transmissions over the Internet or email that have already arrived at
the recipient”), and State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 484 (Wash. Ct. App.) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages once the recipient received the
messages), review granted, 291 P.3d 253 (Wash. 2012), with United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a
commercial ISP.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that email metadata, such
as the to and from address and the amount of data exchanged, is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, but stating that the contents of emails “may deserve Fourth
Amendment protection”).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19 (1986); see also House ECPA Hearing, supra note 20,
at 44 (statement of Fred W. Weingarten, Program Manager, Communication and
Technologies Program, Office of Technology Assessment) (indicating that
consumers will not use these services and companies will not develop and sell the
services if they are not adequately protected).
55. ECPA (Part I): Lawful Access to Stored Content: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter ECPA Part I Hearing] (statement of F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., &
Investigations) (observing the legal landscape in 1986 with regard to the inadequate
protections for electronic communications that led to the passage of the SCA).
56. See discussion infra Part I.C (setting forth the structure of the SCA).
57. ECPA Part I Hearing, supra note 55, at 4 (statement of Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Judiciary).
58. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (“[The ECPA] represents a fair balance
between the privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of
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C. The Structure of the SCA
The SCA protects stored electronic communications in three ways.
First, § 2701 provides a cause of action against anyone who
intentionally “obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access” to certain
stored communications.59 Second, § 2702 governs when network
providers may voluntarily disclose customer communications and
records.60 Finally, § 2703 regulates when state actors, such as federal
and state law enforcement officers, may compel disclosure of stored
communications from network service providers.61
The statute provides different levels of protection based on the
drafters’ “perceived importance of the privacy interest involved.”62
The level of protection afforded to any particular information sought
turns on two factors: (1) the classification of the network provider
and (2) whether the information being sought is in “electronic
storage.”63 The SCA addresses the meaning of both of these
important factors.
1.

Definitions
Congress drafted the SCA with an eye toward the two predominant
types of service providers at the time of its passage, which differed in
The SCA therefore
how and why they stored users’ data.64
distinguishes between “electronic communication service”65 (ECS)
and “remote computing service”66 (RCS) providers.
An ECS is defined as any service that enables a user to send or
receive a wire or electronic communication.67 Essentially, ECS
providers are analogous to the early electronic mail systems, in which
messages would be stored until the user dialed-up and retrieved the
message via telephone.68 Congress also sought to protect information
stored by third-party service providers, albeit to a lesser degree than
ECS stored information, through the creation of RCS. An RCS is
law enforcement agencies.”); Robison, supra note 32, at 1205 (finding that Congress
intended to only provide privacy protection to specific areas of electronic data with
the passage of the SCA).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2) (2012).
60. Id. § 2702.
61. Id. § 2703.
62. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 116.
63. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing privacy protections of the SCA).
64. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (reviewing the two types of service
options predominantly utilized at the time the SCA was legislated).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
66. Id. § 2711(2).
67. Id. § 2510(15).
68. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
interpretations of ECS at the time the SCA was debated).
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defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications
system.”69 Congress intended RCS provisions to regulate information
stored by “an off-site computer that stores or processes data for a
customer.”70 This category covers any long-term remotely stored
communications. Examples of modern services that may qualify as an
RCS provider include Dropbox71 or email stored on Webmail after it
has been opened.72 However, today, nearly all modern technologies
can serve multiple functions with regard to a specific
communication—an important reason why courts find it so difficult
to apply the SCA.73
Finally, the term “electronic storage”—quite possibly the most
important term in the SCA because communications in electronic
storage are afforded the greatest protections“does not simply mean
storage of information by electronic means.”74 Rather, the Act
specifically defines electronic storage as “any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof,”75 as well as “any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes
of backup protection of such communication.”76 The electronic
storage analysis definitively establishes the scope of the SCA.77
2.

Privacy protections
The SCA tracks these two types of providers and sets forth a
bifurcated approach, which generally provides greater protection to
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). An “electronic communications system” is broadly
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14).
70. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 119.
71. Dropbox is an online storage provider that allows users to store photos,
documents, videos and files on a remote server so that users can access this data from
anywhere. What’s Dropbox?, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/tour/1 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2013).
72. See discussion supra Part IV.A (reasoning that post-transmission emails left in
storage on webmail servers fall under the RCS provisions).
73. Eric R. Hinz, Note, A Distinctionless Distinction: Why the RCS/ECS Distinction in
the Stored Communications Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 515 (2012)
(showing how Dropbox, while most clearly resembling an RCS, can arguably be
categorized as an ECS when its sharing function is considered); see supra Part II.A
(discussing the split of authority surrounding whether an opened email is protected
by the act’s ECS provisions or falls under the RCS category).
74. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 123.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A). For clarity’s sake, this Note refers to storage
described in this subsection as “temporary, intermediate storage.”
76. Id. § 2510(17)(B). This Note refers to storage described in this
subsection as “backup.”
77. See discussion infra Part II.B (debating how differing definitions of electronic
storage can change the classification between ECS and RCS, which in turn affects the
applicable scope of the SCA).
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information stored by an ECS in “electronic storage.”78 A simple
subpoena and prior notice of acquisition of electronic
communications to the user can compel electronic communications
that are not in electronic storage and held by an RCS.79 Alternatively,
the government must comply with the more stringent requirement of
obtaining a warrant for electronic communications that are held by
an ECS in electronic storage for less than 180 days.80 More
importantly, there is a private cause of action for unauthorized access
only if the unlawfully obtained communications are held by an ECS
provider in electronic storage.81 Thus, the scope of the SCA depends
on whether an electronic communication is held by an ECS or RCS
provider and whether the communication is in electronic storage.
This specifically tailored and complicated approach indicates that
the SCA is “not a catch-all statute.”82 Rather, it reflects Congress’s
careful attempt to fill the gap left open by Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the Wiretap Act by protecting individuals when
they have an actual, reasonable expectation of privacy.83
Unfortunately, cases interpreting the scope of the SCA are in
disarray, and some courts have extended the SCA into areas that
Congress likely never intended.
II. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY THE SCA
A. Whether “Post-Transmission” Storage Qualifies as Electronic Storage
Courts across the country disagree on what constitutes “backup
protection” under the SCA’s definition of electronic storage.84
78. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (unauthorized access provision only available if
communication is stored by ECS in “electronic storage”), id. § 2702(a)
(prohibiting public ECS providers from voluntarily disclosing communications in
electronic storage by that service), and id. § 2703(a) (requiring the government
to obtain a warrant to compel communications held by ECS in “electronic
storage” for less than 180 days), with id. § 2703(b)(1)(B) (providing that the
government can compel communications held by RCS providers with only a
subpoena or court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which requires only
“reasonable grounds to believe” that information sought is “relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
79. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
80. See id. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . of a
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an [ECS] for one
hundred and eighty day or less, only pursuant to a warrant.” (emphasis added)).
81. See id. § 2701(a) (providing a cause of action for intentional unauthorized
access to a facility that provides electronic communications service).
82. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1214.
83. See Robison, supra note 32, at 1223–32 (discussing the legislative history of the
SCA and Congress’s intent to provide a limited set of privacy protections where users
needed them most); see also supra notes 46–49 (discussing the Katz test).
84. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B).
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Notably, they agree that unopened communications stored by ECS
providers are in electronic storage and therefore deserve the full
protection of the SCA for 180 days.85 The dispute lies in whether an
already opened email that is stored by a user on the service
provider’s server qualifies for the Act’s heightened “electronic
storage” protections.86
Under the “traditional narrow interpretation,” adopted by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and many courts, post-transmission
emails do not qualify as “electronic storage.”87
Under this
interpretation, the “such communication” language in the electronic
storage backup provision refers to the temporary, intermediate
storage provision.88 Therefore, “electronic storage” is limited to
temporary storage made during transmission of electronic
communications and to backups of intermediate communications by
the service provider to ensure system integrity.89 Under this view,
communications falling outside of the narrow definition are not
protected by the SCA’s electronic storage provisions but may still
receive protection under the RCS provisions.90
In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the traditional narrow interpretation of electronic storage and
created a split in authority that has caused considerable confusion
among courts, service providers, and the government.91 In Theofel v.

85. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463 (5th
Cir. 1994) (invoking the SCA’s warrant requirement for documents in storage for
less than 180 days).
86. These “post transmission emails” include webmail, where all of a user’s emails
are stored on the remote server. See supra Part I.A (arguing that the SCA is
inadequate for modern storage systems).
87. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ under
the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission.”); United States v.
Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772–73 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (“If the [SCA] drafters intended
emails a user leaves on an email service for re-access at a later date to be covered by
section 2702(a)(2), they also must have intended them to be covered by the
Government’s trial subpoena power.”); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the SCA “only protects electronic
communications stored 'for a limited time in the middle of a transmission” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 123–25 (detailing the
types of electronic storage).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76 (listing the definition of
electronic storage).
89. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 123.
90. See id. at 125–26 (illustrating that an email falls under the RCS provisions
once a user retrieves the email and decides to store it on the ISP’s server).
91. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15–21, Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct.
1806 (2013) (No. 12-831), 2013 WL 75746, at *15–21 (noting that the Ninth Circuit
decision has left some states with a rule at odds with the DOJ’s interpretation of the
SCA and has created confusion among district courts).
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Farey-Jones,92 the Ninth Circuit adopted the novel theory that posttransmission email messages qualify as electronic storage for purposes
of the SCA because the messages fall within the backup provision.93
The Theofel court reasoned that interpreting “electronic storage”
restrictively to only cover pre-transmission storage would render the
backup provision superfluous.94 According to the court, any backup
storage pending transmission would already qualify as “temporary,
intermediate storage” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17)(A).95 Therefore, whether the electronic messages at issue
were in storage was not based on prior access.96 Moreover, the court
argued that the backup provision was not limited to “backup
protection” for the ISP’s purposes.97 Rather, storage for the benefit
of the user “literally [fell] within the statutory definition.”98
According to the Theofel court, an opened email stored by an ECS
provider continues to constitute electronic storage until “the
underlying message has expired in the normal course.”99 The court
did not provide any guidance as to when an underlying message
“expire[s] in the normal course,” but it did provide examples
suggesting that the lifespan of a backup turns on whether the user or
the ISP still need to store the email message.100 Some courts have
adopted Theofel’s departure from the traditional interpretation of

92. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
93. See id. at 1075–77 (acknowledging that the court’s position differs from the
Government’s and explaining that the analysis turns on whether messages are stored
for backup-protection purposes).
94. See id. at 1075–76 (noting that, while a copy of an email serves as a backup to
the user and the service, the fact that a copy may be a backup does not necessarily
mean it is stored for that purpose).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 1077 (concluding that the government’s reading of the SCA
was erroneous because prior access is not determinative of whether emails were
in storage).
97. Id. at 1075.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1076.
100. Id. at 1070 (discussing the interrelation of messages a user flags for deletion
and emails sent to or from the service provider’s staff). If either the user or service
provider needs the message, it probably has not expired under Theofel. See Kerr,
supra note 13, at 1217–18 (describing the Theofel standard as a fact-sensitive test
under which it is irrelevant whether an email has been accessed).
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electronic storage,101 but the decision continues to receive substantial
judicial102 and academic criticism.103
B. Whether the RCS/ECS Distinction is Context-Specific or Provider-Specific
A court addressing an SCA challenge must classify modern
technology according to the SCA’s 1986 technological constructs—a
task seemingly akin to fitting a square peg in a round hole. Not
surprisingly, courts across the country are in disarray with regard to
what the proper approach should be. Generally, “a single provider
can simultaneously provide ECS with regard to some communications
and RCS with regard to others, or ECS with regard to some
communications and neither ECS nor RCS with regard to others.”104
What determines their role is the type of communications sought.
The SCA and its legislative history embody the principle that a
provider is categorized as an ECS or RCS based on an analysis of the
provider’s role with respect to the particular communication in
question.105
For example, a service provider that is holding
intermediate temporary copies of a communication incident to
transmission, or backups of those intermediate communications
created by that service provider, is protected under the ECS
provisions.106 The same provider is protected by the RCS rules if it
holds electronic communications in long-term storage.107 The same
101. See, e.g., Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 n.2
(M.D. Tenn. 2008) (asserting that the Theofel court correctly reasoned that an email
remains in electronic storage both before and after it is read; thus purposefully
reading an unauthorized email would be a violation of the SCA); Bailey v. Bailey, No.
07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008) (adopting Theofel and
stating that an email is not removed from the purview of the SCA solely because an
individual read it).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772–73 (C.D. Ill. 2009)
(determining that Theofel’s interpretation of electronic storage “cannot be squared
with legislative history and other provisions of the [SCA]”); Flagg v. City of Detroit,
252 F.R.D. 346, 358–62 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (applying RCS provisions to posttransmission content); Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 247 (S.C. 2012) (Toal, J.,
concurring) (“I advocate a rejection of Theofel entirely and the adoption of the
‘traditional interpretation’ of the SCA, which tracks the statutory language and
comports with legislative history.”), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133 S.
Ct. 1806 (2013).
103. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, at 1217 & n.61 (providing several reasons why
Theofel’s analysis “is quite implausible and hard to square with the statutory text”);
Hinz, supra note 73, at 504 (noting that the court never explained what the “normal
course” might be).
104. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 127 (explaining the complexities within
the ECS/RCS relationship).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 65 (1986) (suggesting that when a user chooses to
store a copy of an email on the ISP’s server after retrieving the email, the email is
protected under the RCS and not the ECS provisions).
106. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1215–16.
107. Id.
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is true for copies of the communication.108 The communication is
protected under the ECS rules as long as it is held in temporary
storage.109 Once the communication is placed in long-term storage, it
is protected by the RCS rules.110
This legislative intent, however, was arguably ignored by the Ninth
Circuit in a case decided shortly after Theofel. The Theofel court
hinted that a network provider cannot qualify as an ECS when it
stores the only copy of an electronic communication.111 However, in
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,112 the court seemingly refuted the
dicta in Theofel by focusing on the predominant “nature of services”
offered by the provider. In doing so, Quon essentially expanded
Theofel’s holding to network service providers that provide permanent
post-transmission storage.113
The communications at issue in Quon were permanently archived
text messages held by a cell phone service provider.114 The court
reasoned that although archived text messages could be considered a
“virtual filing cabinet” and thereby resemble RCS, the provider
qualified as an ECS because a cell phone service provider
predominantly offers services more analogous to those of an ECS.115
The provider’s archival of text messages merely qualified as “backup”
as characterized in Theofel.116
Together, Theofel and Quon suggest that providers are categorized
as a whole, rather than looking to particular communications.
Therefore, a service provider that predominately provides ECS-like
services will remain an ECS—with its communications in “electronic
storage”—indefinitely. Likewise, RCS providers will remain subject to
the RCS provisions without regard to the role they play with respect
to the communication sought.117 Like Theofel, Quon’s “unitary
approach” has received considerable criticism, prompting some

108. Id. at 1216.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A[n RCS]
might be the only place a user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not
stored for backup purposes.”).
112. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ont. v.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
113. See id. at 900; see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 361–62 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (explaining the dicta in Theofel and its applicability to Quon).
114. Quon, 529 F.3d at 900.
115. See id. at 902 (explicating that the provider essentially “served as a conduit for
the transmission of electronic communications”).
116. See id. (classifying the service provided as ECS rather than RCS)
117. See id. at 900–01 (contrasting the characteristics of RCS with those of ECS).
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courts to reject it.118 This split in authority has left courts confused as
to what standard to apply in SCA actions.
C. A State Supreme Court Weighs In
In Jennings, the Supreme Court of South Carolina attempted to
make sense of the conflicting interpretations and determine the
application of the SCA’s unauthorized access provision in § 2701 to
emails stored by Yahoo!’s webmail service.119 The case arose from a
civil action involving § 2701, but its holding has implications beyond
such private actions due to its interpretation of “electronic
storage.”120 Notably, the Jennings opinion and its lower court rulings
are illustrative of the confusion that courts experience when
interpreting the SCA’s scope and the “headaches” that arise because
of that ambiguity.
Jennings arose out of a marital feud. Lee Jennings confessed to his
wife, Gail Jennings, that he had fallen in love with another woman,
but refused to disclose that woman’s identity.121 He did, however,
indicate that he corresponded with the woman via email.122 Mrs.
Jennings’ daughter-in-law, Holly Broome, gained access to these
emails by guessing the answers to Mr. Jennings’s security questions on
his Yahoo! email account.123 During the course of the divorce
proceeding, Mr. Jennings discovered that his emails had been hacked
and sued Ms. Broome and his wife, along with his wife’s divorce
attorney and private investigator, for alleged violations of the SCA.124
The suit resulted in a multi-year litigation, a flip-flop of three
118. See, e.g., Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 362–63 (rejecting Quon and holding that a cell
phone service provider was acting as an RCS with respect to archived text messages
because the provider should be classified “with regard to a particular
communication, and [not based] upon the classification of the service provider or on
broad notions of the service that [it] generally or predominantly provides”).
119. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 243 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). As previously mentioned, § 2701
requires that the electronic communication be held by the ECS in “electronic
storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012); see supra note 102 and accompanying text
(discussing the SCA’s unauthorized access language).
120. For a description of the importance of the term “electronic storage,” see
discussion supra Part I.C.2 and infra Part III. See also Orin Kerr, South Carolina
Supreme Court Creates Split with Ninth Circuit on Privacy in Stored E-mails—and Divides 2-21 on the Rationale, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2012/10/10/sourth-carolina-supreme-court-deepens-split-on-privacy-in-stored-e-mails
-and-divides-2-2-1-on-the-rationale (postulating that Jennings “really calls out for U.S.
Supreme Court review” because of its broad application and uncertainty relating to
the definition of electronic storage).
121. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 243.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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court opinions, and a denial of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. 125
The South Carolina trial court found that Mr. Jennings’s emails did
not meet the requisite element of being in “electronic storage”
because his personal storage of emails, which could be deleted at any
time, could “hardly be considered part of any ‘backup protection’
system operated by an [ECS].”126 The Court of Appeals of South
Carolina reversed the trial court and found that Yahoo! undoubtedly
provided ECS for Mr. Jennings’s emails and that the emails qualified
as electronic storage under the backup provision.127 The appellate
court applied Quon and Theofel to find that Yahoo! “unquestionably”
qualified as an ECS by virtue of its overall service in giving its users
the ability to send or receive emails.128 The stored emails qualified as
backup because they “were stored on Yahoo’s servers so that, if
necessary, [Mr. Jennings] could access them again.”129
The Supreme Court of South Carolina unanimously reversed the
appellate court but could not agree on a rationale for doing so.130
Consequently, the judges issued three separate opinions131 In the
majority opinion, Justice Hearn espoused a textual approach and
suggested that the critical question a court must ask to determine
whether an electronic communication lies within the backup
provision is whether a second copy of the communication exists.132
Copies of Mr. Jennings’s emails stored on Yahoo!’s server could not
qualify as “backup” because no evidence indicated that he
downloaded or saved another copy of the emails after reading

125. See Jennings v. Jennings, No. 07-CP-40-1125, 2008 WL 8185934 (S.C.C.P. Sept.
23, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 697 S.E.2d 671 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 736
S.E.2d 242, cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
126. Jennings, 2008 WL 8185934.
127. Jennings, 697 S.E.2d at 676–78, 681.
128. Id. at 676.
129. Id. at 678.
130. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 243.
131. See id. at 243, 245.
132. Id. at 245. Notably, this approach was adopted by a federal district court in
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009). The Weaver court
invoked dicta from Theofel to argue that Theofel’s reasoning “relies on the assumption
that users download[ed] emails from an ISP’s server to their own computers.”
Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 771–72. The court distinguished “web-based” from “nonweb-based” email and found that Theofel is inapplicable to “web-based” email because
“[u]sers of web-based email systems . . . default to saving their messages only on the
remote system.” Id. at 772. However, the court argued, users can receive protection
for “web-based” email under Theofel if they deviate from the “default method” and
opt to connect to an email program that downloads messages to a personal
computer, such as Microsoft Outlook. Id.
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them.133 In employing this technical interpretation, the majority was
able to avoid the appellate court’s reliance on Theofel without
explicitly rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s holding.134
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Toal advocated for
a complete rejection of Theofel.135 The Chief Justice reasoned that the
conjunctive “and” in the electronic storage definition necessarily
indicated Congress’s intent that “electronic storage” encompass both
temporary, intermediate storage and backups of those
communications.136 Relying on the text and legislative history of the
SCA, Chief Justice Toal concluded that the DOJ’s traditional narrow
interpretation “provide[d] a sounder basis” for the court’s holding.137
Lastly, Justice Pleicones’s opinion incorporated both Justice Hearn
and Chief Justice Toal’s opinions but provided a different view on the
relationship between the temporary, intermediate storage and
backup provisions of the electronic storage definition.138
He
emphasized that determining whether an electronic communication
is in “electronic storage” necessitates an inquiry into both whether
the electronic communication is in temporary or intermediate
storage, and whether it qualifies as backup.139 Justice Pleicones
argued that the two provisions describe two types of storage that are
“necessarily distinct from one another.”140 Therefore, “an email is
protected if it falls under the definition of either subsection (A) or
(B).”141
While technically providing a different view on the
relationship between the two electronic storage provisions, Justice
Pleicones’s opinion is substantively identical to Chief Justice Toal’s.142
133. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245 (reasoning that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the
word ‘backup’ is ‘one that serves as a substitute or support’” (quoting Backup
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/backup (last visited Sept. 28, 2013))).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 247 (Toal, C.J., concurring).
136. Id. (“Justice Hearn’s approach would delete [the] word [“and”] and insert
[“or”] into the statutory text, effectively writing out subsection A from the definition
of electronic storage.”).
137. Id. at 245. Chief Justice’s Toal’s statement that the definition of electronic
storage encompasses both intermediate storage and storage for backup protection
does not mean that both subsections (A) and (B) must apply. Kerr, supra note 120.
Instead, Chief Justice Toal’s view is that the storage for purposes of “backup
protection” in “(b) refers to back up copies of emails in (a).” Id. (explaining the
difficulty in interpreting subsections (A) and (B) of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012)).
138. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 248–49 (Pleicones, J., concurring) (distinguishing
that the second copy is created for backup purposes.
139. Id. at 249.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 249 n.4. Justice Pleicones wrote a separate opinion to emphasize the
idea that analyzing whether an electronic communication is in “electronic storage”
requires a court to determine not only whether the electronic communication is in
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The SCA’s outdated and complicated framework is exemplified in
Jennings. The three differing opinions are perhaps the most
illustrative example of the difficulties courts encounter when
applying the SCA as a result of the conflicting jurisprudence
interpreting the statute. These difficulties raise serious concerns
about the privacy of electronic communications and the continued
growth of technological progress.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE SCA
Despite its previous ability to adapt to vast changes in technology,
the twenty-seven-year-old SCA has become hopelessly outdated. The
Act’s framework made sense in 1986 when service providers served
two distinct functions, technology and computers were not widely
accessible, and remote storage of electronic communications was
prohibitively expensive. Today, email has become an integral and
necessary part of Americans’ professional and personal lives.143 Most
Americans use webmail services and many store these emails and
other personal information on the cloud.144 Individuals use the cloud
to store information ranging from personal emails, photos, and
videos as a complete back-up of their hard drive.145 Businesses store
emails and highly sensitive information, such as medical and financial
data, trade secret information, and business plans on the cloud.146
The legal uncertainty surrounding the protections afforded to these
remotely stored communications leaves today’s Congress with the

temporary, intermediate storage, but also whether it qualifies as backup. Id. at 249.
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Toal’s opinion does not advocate that only temporary,
intermediate storage qualifies as electronic storage. Her opinion calls for two types
of protected storage: (1) temporary, intermediate storage and (2) backups of those
“intermediate communications.” Id. at 248 (Toal, J., concurring). The inquiry does
not stop at temporary, intermediate storage. Therefore, while theoretically different,
Justice Pleicones’s opinion does not practically differ from Chief Justice Toal’s.
143 See generally Trend Data (Adults), PEW INTERNET, http://www.pewinternet.org
/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-%28Adults%29/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last visited
Sept. 28, 2013) (indicating that as of May 2013, 85% of adults in the United States
use the Internet and 88% of those users send or receive email).
144. See John B. Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW
INTERNET, (Sept. 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/
PIP_Cloud.Memo.pdf.pdf (documenting that as of September 2008, 69% of Internet
users use webmail services and other cloud services).
145. Om Malik, Infographic: Cloud Computing by the Numbers, GIGAOM (Dec. 7,
2010, 8:54 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/07/infographic-cloud-computing-bythe-numbers.
146. See Reuven Cohen, The Cloud Hits the Mainstream: More than Half of U.S. Businesses
Now Use Cloud Computing, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/reuvencohen/2013/04/16/the-cloud-hits-the-mainstream-more-than-half-of-us-businesses
-now-use-cloud-computing.
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same problem the 1986 Congress faced—an outdated statute that
threatens to inhibit technological innovation.
The 1980s signaled the beginning of an “information age” that
fundamentally transformed the lives of individuals throughout the
world in ways in which the 1986 Congress could never have
imagined.147 Advertisements for state-of-the-art electronics of the
1980s reveal primitive technology compared to what is available to
consumers today.148 More exciting innovations lie ahead of us.149
Twenty (and even ten) years from now, newer generations will likely
come across advertisements for a $1,400 3D scanner150 and other
gadgets that we consider cutting edge and find the technology and
price laughable.151 However, a failure to update the SCA will
147. See John Tammy, A Blast Back to Our ‘Glorious’ 1980s Past? Not on Your Life!,
FORBES (Apr. 21, 2013, 10:00 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2013
/04/21/a-blast-back-to-our-glorious-1980s-past-not-on-your-life
(illustrating
how
simple tasks, such as finding and booking travel reservations, accessing news
and sports scores, and coordinating with others on plans, were quite difficult
in the 1980s).
148. In fact, a number of websites and blogs have posted articles and videos meant
to poke fun at the outdated technology. See, e.g., Brie Hiramine, 15 Hilarious
Technology Ads from the 1980s, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/2013/06/19/vintagetech-ads (June 19, 2013) (framing older technology ads as “funny” compared to
modern-day technology); Jason M. Vaughn, Viral Video: Modern Kids Take on 1980’s
Technology, FOX 4, http://fox4kc.com/2012/07/09/viral-video-modern-kids-take-on1980s-technology (July 9, 2012, 9:37 AM) (showing modern children attempting to
operate 1980s technology such as a cassette player, a Commodore 64 computer, and
an Atari game).
149. See Mark P. Mills, The Next Great Growth Cycle, AMERICAN (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.american.com/archive/2012/august/the-next-great-growth-cycle
(arguing that a new technology revolution is approaching and will be spurred
by three existing innovations: “Big Data, the Wireless Wired World, and
Computational Manufacturing”).
150. See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, Makerbot’s Desktop Scanner for 3D Printers Will Cost You
$1,400, INFOWORLD, http://www.infoworld.com/d/computer-hardware/makerbotsdesktop-scanner-3d-printers-will-cost-you-1400-225470.
151. See supra note 148 (describing various blogs and articles making fun of
1980s technologies). See generally Oliver Burkeman, Forty Years of the Internet: How
the World Changed Forever, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2009/oct/23/internet-40-history-arpanet (stating that one day in the
near future, all of the progress that we have seen in the past forty years will seem like
“early throat-clearings—mere preparations for whatever the internet is destined to
become”). The relatively recent advent of “smart phones,” which are now pervasive,
demonstrates how fast technologies—and prices—can change. For example, in
2002, only eleven years ago, Blackberry first added phone capabilities to its devices,
which traditionally offered only push email systems and organizer capabilities for
corporations. Bruce Brown & Marge Brown, BlackBerry 5810: Not-So-Convenient
Combo Communicator, PC M AG . (May 13, 2002), http://www.pcmag.com/article2
/0,2817,3563,00.asp. The Blackberry 5810 had a retail price of $499 in 2002. Id.
Today, it is hard to imagine anything that cannot be done on a smartphone, such as
Apple’s iPhone or Samsung’s Galaxy, at a fraction of the price. See iPhone 5s Review:
Same Look, Small Screen, Big Potential, CNET (Sept. 20, 2013), http://reviews.cnet.com
/iphone-5s (showing that the iPhone 5S is available for as low as $199.99); Samsung
Galaxy S4 Review: The Everything Phone for (Almost) Everyone, CNET (Apr. 23, 2013),
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inevitably stunt progress by not providing consumers and businesses
the confidence to use new technologies.152 This “chilling effect” will
negatively impact consumer choice and the economy on both a
national and global level.153
Fortunately, legislators have
introduced a number of proposals to address these concerns, and
recent events have fueled a privacy debate, suggesting that SCA
reform may be imminent.154
Until Congress acts, however, courts must construe the SCA
according to its current terms. As the fragmented opinions in
Jennings demonstrate, attempting to fit modern technology into the
limited technological framework of 1986 has proven to be a daunting
task. This difficulty has had impacts beyond courts’ application of
the SCA. The conflicting opinions make it impossible to predict the
outcome of cases and leave individuals, service providers, and law
enforcement agencies in the dark about their rights and
responsibilities. Additionally, the confusion surrounding the SCA’s
applicability encourages forum shopping, as the outcome of a case is
inextricably tied to where the case is litigated.155 Therefore, it is
http://reviews.cnet.com/samsung-galaxy-s4 (demonstrating the Galaxy S4, with its
“laundry list” of features, is available for as low as $99.99).
152. Jeff Jarvis, I Fear the Chilling Effect of NSA Surveillance on the Open Internet,
GUARDIAN, (June 17, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2013/jun/17/chilling-effect-nsa-surveillance-internet (expressing concern that
increased media coverage of the government’s spy operations could cause
consumers, businesses, and international users to distrust the Internet and deter
people from electronically communicating, sharing, and storing information).
153. See id.; Elizabeth MacDonald, NSA Leaks Slam Cloud Computing Industry, FOX
BUS. (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2013/08/09/nsaleaks-slam-cloud-computing-industry (“U.S. technology companies warn they could
lose between $21.5 billion to $35 billion in global cloud computing contracts over
the next three years due to negative fallout from the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA) spying programs on Internet users, including emails.”); see also Internet Matters:
The Net’s Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs, and Prosperity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (May 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_m
atters (documenting the Internet’s contribution to the global economy and the
United States’ role as “the largest player in the global Internet supply ecosystem”);
Robert Lemos, U.S. Surveillance Fallout Costing Third-Party Providers, DARK READING
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.darkreading.com/monitoring/us-surveillance-falloutcosting-third-pa/240160404 (noting that two secure email service providers—Lavabit
and Silent Circle—shut down email services in the United States due to concerns
that privacy laws failed to protect their customer’s stored email communications).
154. Increasing media coverage and public outrage illustrating the real privacy
threat to remotely stored electronic communications has prompted members of
Congress from both the Republican and Democrat parties to join together and
support reforming the SCA. See Carl M. Cannon, Digital Privacy, a Non-Partisan Issue,
REAL C LEAR P OLITICS (July 23, 2013), http:// http://www.realclearpolitics.com
/articles/2013/07/23/digital_privacy_a_non-partisan_issue_119332.html
(stating
that recent revelations that the NSA engaged in a domestic spying operation gaining
access to a host of Americans’ private electronic communications has “given [an]
added impetus” to SCA reform legislation).
155. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Jennings would have been able to
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important to promote consistency by setting forth clear rules that
courts must follow to determine whether a communication is
protected by the SCA.
To provide this consistency, courts should seek to effectuate
Congress’s intent at the time the SCA was enacted in order to avoid
“blur[ring] the distinctive functions of the legislative and judicial
processes.”156 Courts are constricted by the SCA and cannot enlarge
its scope without Congressional authority.157 Doing so would severely
undermine the Nation’s carefully balanced system of government
that delegates specific powers to three separate branches of
government.158 To avoid upsetting this balance, courts must attempt
to classify new technology according to the distinctions embodied in
the SCA.
Despite the seemingly complicated structure of the SCA, an
analysis of the language and legislative history of the Act suggests that
applying its provisions to new technologies, such as webmail, is not an
impossible task. By focusing on the legislative history and intent of
Congress in light of the technology available when it passed the SCA,
a simple framework emerges.
A. Amending the SCA
1.

On the right path: Current proposed reforms
Congress is attempting to tackle the privacy concerns that threaten
to stifle progress. On March 19, 2013, Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments
Act of 2013159 (“S. 607”). This bill would amend the SCA’s voluntary

bring a cause of action under § 2701. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76
(9th Cir. 2004). However, the South Carolina Supreme Court precluded that option.
See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244–45 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
156. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (warning
against creating judicial legislation by deleting a portion of a definitive statute and
applying the resulting definition to the instant case).
157. See Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d,
216 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that courts “must interpret a statute as it is, not as it might
be”); Belfield v. Coop, 134 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ill. 1956) (“The only legitimate function
of the courts is to declare and enforce the law as enacted by the legislature, to
interpret the language used by the legislature where it requires interpretation, and
not to annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or read into a statute
exceptions, limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning.”).
158. See, e.g., Life Receivables Trust, 549 F.3d at 216 (explaining that it is not the role
of the courts to legislate); Schrock v. Shoemaker, 640 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ill. 1994)
(describing the courts’ function within the separation of powers framework provided
by the Constitution).
159. S. 607, 113th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 25,
2013). Two identical proposals have also been introduced in the U.S. House of
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and compelled disclosure provisions in § 2702 and § 2703 to require
the government to obtain a warrant to gain access to the contents of
any electronic communications stored on the cloud.160 First, the bill
would generally prohibit an ECS or RCS from voluntarily disclosing
the contents of its customer’s electronic communications to the
Government.161 Second, the bill would retain the ECS and RCS
distinction but adopt one standard—a search warrant supported by
probable cause—for the disclosure of a customer’s electronic
communications held in “electronic storage with or otherwise stored,
held, or maintained by the provider.”162 Under the new provision,
the government would be required to notify the individual whose
account was disclosed within a specified period of time.163 Finally, S.
607 would eliminate the SCA’s 180-day rule that allows the
government to obtain emails in electronic storage after 180 days.164
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 607 on April 25,
2013.165 The House also held hearings in March and April of 2013
dedicated to ECPA reform, suggesting that Congress is committed to
at least some change in legislation.166
Representatives:
the Email Privacy Act, H.R. 1852 (2013), and the ECPA
Amendments Act, H.R. 1847 (2013). Another similar proposal, introduced by
Representatives Zoe Lofgren, Ted Poe, and Suzan DelBene called the Online
Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983 (2013), is identical to S.
607 with regard to electronic communications but would also require a warrant for
location information generated by mobile phones. As of September 29, 2013, H.R.
1852, H.R. 1847, and H.R. 983 have yet to be heard by their referred committees.
160. See S. 607 § 3(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service of the
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic storage with or
otherwise stored, held, or maintained by the provider only if the governmental entity
obtains a warrant . . . .”).
161. See id. § 2. There are current exceptions to this prohibition already
embodied in the law, such as the customer consent requirement. See id. § 3 (a).
162. See id. § 3(a) (requiring the government to obtain a warrant for the contents
of remote computing services as well). The language after electronic storage clarifies
that electronic storage included opened and unopened emails.
163. Id. (requiring government notification, along with a copy of the search
warrant and other details about the information acquired, within ten businesses days
for a law enforcement agency and three business days for other agencies). The bill
also provides procedures and standards the government may use to delay this notice
requirement. Id. § 4.
164. See id. § 4 (“A governmental entity that is seeking a warrant under section
2703(a) may include in the application for the warrant a request for an order
delaying the notification required under section 2703(b) for a period of not more
than 180 days in the case of a law enforcement agency, or not more than 90 days in
the case of any other governmental entity.”).
165. David Kravets, Law Requiring Warrants for E-mail Wins Senate Committee Approval,
WIRED (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/04/emailwarrants-bill.
166. See ECPA Part I Hearing, supra note 55, at 4 (statement of Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating the Judiciary Committee “will modernize
the decades’ old Electronic Communications Privacy Act to reflect our current digital
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2.

Suggested amendments to modernize the statute
The SCA’s complicated structure has confused courts and created a
myriad of different protections that are seemingly inconsistent.167 For
example, under the current language, the same email is subject to
different protection depending on whether it is in transit, stored on a
home computer, opened and stored in remote storage, unopened
and stored in remote storage for 180 days or less, or unopened and
stored in remote storage for more than 180 days.168 It is therefore not
surprising that courts have difficulty construing the statute. Any
change to the SCA should focus on simplifying this structure to
ensure consistent results and avoid the need for further legislative
revisions soon after its enactment.
Such a proposal would include three key changes. First, Congress
should focus on technological neutrality to ensure the vitality of the
amendment for years to come.169 The 1986 Congress achieved its
goal of technological neutrality when it enacted the SCA in some
respects170 but failed in others.171 Accordingly, the SCA is illustrative
of the benefits of technological neutrality and the cautions of the lack
thereof. The neutral aspect of the SCA allows it to be equally
applicable to webmail and newer technologies such as Facebook

economy while preserving constitutional protections”); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 63 (2013) (statement of Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (identifying a future goal to “protect individual liberties by
providing clear guidelines for when and how geolocation information can be
accessed and used”).
167. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. (outlining privacy protections of the SCA); see
also discussion supra Part II.A. (noting the conflict between courts with regard to
whether “post-transmission” storage qualifies as electronic storage).
168. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) EPIC http://epic.org/privacy/ecpa
/#background (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (illustrating, in a table, the different levels
of protection for email under the SCA).
169. See H. REP. No. 106-932, at 9 n.1 (2000) (noting that “[r]egulation tied to a
particular technology may quickly become obsolete and require further amendment”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kevin Bankston, Today’s Other ECPA Reform
News: Location Privacy Hearing in the House, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 25,
2013)
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/kevin-bankston/2504today%E2%80%99s-otherecpa-reform-news-location-privacy-hearing-house
(“[L]egislation
that
isn’t
technology neutral . . . is doomed to become increasingly meaningless.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
170. John R. Kresse, Comment, Privacy of Conversations over Cordless and Cellular
Telephones: Federal Protection Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 9
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 335, 342 (1987) (stating that the ECPA embodied a broad
and general definition of wire, oral, and electronic communications to meet the
drafters’ goal of drafting a “technology neutral” statute).
171. See supra Part II.C (discussing the structure of the SCA and its framework
based on the two predominant types of service providers at the time of its passage).
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messages and private Twitter Direct Messages.172 On the other hand,
by virtue of the Act’s structure being necessarily based on the types of
service providers in 1986 and the ways users and service providers
traditionally stored communications, the Act has become obsolete,
and many forms of modern communications are left without
protection.173 Consequently, Congress should update the Act’s
framework by eliminating the outdated distinctions between ECS and
RCS and instead providing rules based on the type of communication
involved.174 In so doing, the amendment will be technologically
neutral and achieve the objective that Congress sought in 1986.175
Second, Congress should provide a clear definition of electronic
storage that, at the very least, clarifies that the term “electronic
storage” encompasses both opened and unopened emails.176
Whether an email is in transit, opened, or unopened should not
determine its level of protection. Expanding the electronic storage
definition in this manner will ensure proper protection from
unauthorized access by a private party or the government.
S. 607 attempts to settle the opened/unopened distinction by
including language indicating that all communications in electronic
storage “with or otherwise stored, held or maintained” by an ECS or
RCS are subject to a warrant requirement.177 However, the bill’s
failure to provide a clear definition of electronic storage, coupled
172. Chris Soghoian, US Surveillance Law May Poorly Protect New Text Message Services,
ACLU (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-securitytechnology-and-liberty/us-surveillance-law-may-poorly-protect-new-text
(observing
that, while the privacy laws have a number of flaws, the fact that they are “largely
neutral with respect to particular technologies” has allowed them to adapt to newer
forms of communication, such as Facebook messages and Snapchat photos).
173. See supra Part II (discussing the problems courts experience in trying to
categorize modern technology into technological constructs from 1986).
174. Hinz, supra note 73, at 514–18 (illustrating how new technologies, such as
Dropbox, Webmail, and social networking websites, blur the ECS and RCS lines
because they can be categorized as both).
175. See supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text.
176. The distinction between opened and unopened communications is the
product of 1986 technologies, when few Americans had access to a computer, the
Internet, or email, and the feasibility of remote storage was virtually nonexistent. See
discussion supra Part I.A. This is likely the reason that the 1986 Congress decided
remote storage was not entitled to the heightened ECS protections. See supra text
accompanying note 62 (stating that the SCA provides different levels of protection
based on the privacy interest involved). Because remote storage was not widely
available, and most individuals and businesses downloaded private email
communications to their computers, the need for protecting these communications
in remote storage was not yet apparent. As access to email and remote storage has
increased and become ubiquitous, the opened versus unopened differentiation no
longer makes sense. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text (demonstrating
that the majority of American adults now use email and cloud computing services).
177. S. 607, 113th Cong. § 3(a) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr.
25, 2013).
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with its retention of the ECS and RCS distinctions raises questions as
to the scope of electronic storage.178 Moreover, challenges under
§ 2701 will remain subject to the ambiguous case law discussed in Part
II, including Jennings.179 This remaining uncertainty is unfortunate
because courts continue to grapple with this very issue and would
greatly benefit from a clear directive.180
With a clear definition of electronic storage, Congress should
then provide for one disclosure standard: the government must
obtain a warrant to gain access to emails that are held in
electronic storage.181 This rule would ensure consistent results
and account for society’s changing privacy expectations
regarding electronic communications. 182
Because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding privacy
protections focuses on necessity and expectations, Congress could
evaluate the necessity of using electronic communications and
178. For example, the bill is ambiguous regarding whether Congress would be
imposing a warrant requirement for all remotely stored communications or just
emails. A court could arguably find support for either argument. Electronic storage
necessarily requires either “temporary, intermediate storage” or storage of such
communication by an ECS for backup protection. A court could interpret S. 607’s
new language as still requiring an analysis of “electronic storage” prior to applying
the warrant requirement. A court could therefore reason that communications held
by an RCS provider (whatever it determines that to be) still cannot be in electronic
storage and, therefore, are not subject to the warrant requirement. This is because
the only “stored” communications that can qualify as electronic storage are those
held by an ECS. Alternatively, a court could find that all stored communications
are subject to the warrant requirement by interpreting the “otherwise stored,
held, or maintained” language as nullifying the electronic storage definition’s
“temporary, intermediate” storage. If Congress does intend that courts apply
this second interpretation, then why would it retain the electronic storage, RCS,
and ECS distinctions? In either case, Congress should provide clearer rules for
courts to apply.
179. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that the SCA provides a
private cause of action only if the communication was in electronic storage when it
was unlawfully acquired); see also discussion supra Part II (discussing case law
interpreting the SCA).
180. Compare Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., No. 2:11-CV-03305
(WJM), 2013 WL 4436539, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) (invoking Theofel and Quon to
find that Facebook wall posts were held in electronic storage under the SCA’s backup
provision even though they are stored indefinitely), with Lazette v. Kulmatycki, No.
12-02416, 2013 WL 2455937, at *7 & n.13 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2013) (rejecting
Theofel and Quon to hold that opened emails stored on a remote server did not
qualify as “electronic storage” because they were not being kept for the purposes
of backup protection).
181. S. REP. NO. 113-34, at 3 (2013) (indicating that one disclosure standard
requiring a warrant for compelled disclosure is necessary to “keep pace with the
advances in technology in order to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth
Amendment”).
182. Id. at 2–3 (noting that most Americans regularly use email in their personal
and professional capacities and often use it for confidential communications, and
the constitutional uncertainty of SCA provisions allows for the acquisition of personal
emails by the government without a search warrant).
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remote computing servicers with users’ expectation that their
communications would not be exposed to a service provider when
adapting the third-party doctrine.183 In 1986, few people had access
to remote storage, the Internet, or even a computer.184 Today, these
things are not only convenient, but, for many, are necessities of
everyday life.185 Few Americans make it through a day without
accessing a computer or the Internet.186 Without access to these
forms of communications, modern businesses could not function and
citizens’ lives would be significantly impacted.187 Individuals should
not be forced to sacrifice privacy in order to effectively communicate.
Therefore, the government should be required to obtain a warrant to
gain access to these electronic communications.188
Finally, as S. 607 does, Congress should eliminate the 180-day
distinction.189 In 1986, there was no plausible reason why a service
provider would keep an electronic communication over 180 days.
Therefore, Congress adopted the 180-day rule because it analogized a
stored email for over 180 days as abandoned property using Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and archaic property law principles.190
According to Congress, individuals did not have a reasonable
183. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
showing that Fourth Amendment protection changes as the expectations of
society change).
184. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN
THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, at 1–2 & fig.1, 9, 11 (2013),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf (“In 2011, 75.6
percent of households reported having a computer, compared with only 8.2 percent
in 1984 . . . .”). See generally Angela Bartels, [INFOGRAPHIC] Data Storage 101,
RACKSPACE (July 20, 2011), http://www.rackspace.com/blog/infographic-datastorage-101 (stating that only 1% of data was stored digitally in 1986 compared to
94% in 2007); supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibitive cost
of storage).
185. CISCO, 2011 CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECHNOLOGY REPORT 10 (2011), available
at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns1120/index.html#~2011 (reporting a
survey of college students and young professionals around the world showing that
nearly one-third of respondents believe “the Internet is as important to them as
water, food, air, and shelter”).
186. See More Than 2 Billion People Use the Internet, Here’s What They’re Up To,
CULTURE-IST (May 9, 2013), http://www.thecultureist.com/2013/05/09/how-manypeople-use-the-internet-more-than-2-billion-infographic (showing that 70% of the 2.4
billion Internet users worldwide use the Internet every day and that there are eight
new Internet users every second).
187. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, 2010 SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SURVEY 3, 7
(2010), available at http://www.nsba.biz/docs/nsba_2010_technology_survey.pdf
(noting that “[t]he average small-business owner uses 19 computers in his or her
business” and that 84% of small businesses have a web site).
188. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1299–30 (2004) (discussing justifications for implementing a universal
search warrant requirement).
189. S. 607, 113th Cong. 3 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 25, 2013).
190. H.R. REP. NO. 113-34, at 2 (2013).
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expectation of privacy in these messages.191 The 180-day rule is
largely irrelevant in today’s society as email is saved for years on
remote servers.192 Many of these saved emails are password protected,
and most individuals reasonably believe that service providers do not
have access to them.193
B. Judicial Change: A Simple Approach to Applying the Current SCA
Until Congress provides the necessary reforms, courts must
construe the statute and carry out Congress’s intent from when the
SCA was enacted. The legislative history and statutory text provide
helpful guidance. As previously mentioned, privacy protections
under the SCA hinge on whether a provider is an ECS or RCS and
whether the information is in “electronic storage.”194
Most
commentators and courts either treat these distinctions as two
separate inquiries or muddle them without explanation.195 However,
close examination of the statute and legislative history indicate that
the process of determining the scope of the SCA is more
straightforward than these cases would suggest.
Rather than focusing on specific technologies, Congress phrased
the protections throughout the SCA in terms of transmission in an
effort to draft a forward-looking statute that would evolve to keep up
with new technologies.196 Thus, the Act focused on the function that
191. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1375, 1422 (2004) (stating that the SCA’s 180-day rule necessarily
embodies the premise that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in those communications).
192. See Garmon, supra note 37 (noting the vast amount of emails users save on
Gmail servers).
193. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (reasoning
that society is prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in email
because email has, in many ways, replaced traditional forms of communication such
as the telephone call and letter); Get the Facts, SCROOGLED, http://www.scroogled.com
/mail/GetTheFacts (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (showing results of a 2012 study
indicating that 89% of Gmail users believe their email is private).
194. See discussion supra Part II.A–B (weighing the similarities and differences
between ECS and RCS).
195. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding archived text messages in backup of “electronic storage” definition
because cell-service provider qualified as ECS), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of
Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 249
(2012) (Toal, J., concurring) (reasoning that Mr. Jenning’s emails were not in
“electronic storage” by invoking legislative history indicating that Yahoo! was RCS),
cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
196. See A Bill To Amend Title 18, United States Code, with Respect to the Interception of
Certain Communications, Other Forms of Surveillance, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S.
1667 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 37–39 (1985) (statement of Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead) (opining
that legislation attempting to take into account the specifics of varying, evolving
technology would be too complex and would require frequent revisions).
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ISPs play for their customers rather than the medium used to provide
the service.197 The language and structure of the Act provide
considerable insight into Congress’s intent with regard to the
function that must be analyzed to determine the SCA’s applicability.
The Act impliedly distinguishes between two types of storage:
electronic storage and regular computer storage.198 It then links the
type of storage to ECS providers or RCS providers.199
The
unauthorized access provision in § 2701 only provides a cause of
action for communications held by ECS providers in electronic
storage.200 Similarly, the Act’s ECS provisions in § 2702(a)(1) and
§ 2703(a) only protect information in electronic storage.201 On the
other hand, the RCS provisions in § 2702(a)(2) and § 2703(b), as
well as the definition of RCS in § 2711(2), protect regular computer
storage.202 The term “electronic storage” only appears in conjunction
with ECS providers,203 and the term “computer storage” only appears
in connection with RCS providers.204 This link indicates that the type
of storage service provided is the “function” that Congress described
in the legislative history as dispositive in the SCA analysis.205 This
interpretation focuses on a service provider’s actual function with
regard to a particular communication rather than categorization of
archaic technological frameworks—the exact solution Congress
envisioned to combat the growing privacy implications of rapidly
changing technology.206
With this understanding, a more straightforward framework
emerges and provides three options for all electronic
communications. First, if a communication lies within the “electronic
storage” definition, it is protected under the ECS provisions as long
as it is not older than 180 days and does not fall under an exception

197. See id. at 37 (explaining the significance of focusing the Act on a function
rather than a technology).
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.
199. See infra notes 200–204.
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012).
201. See id. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2703(a).
202. See id. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2703(b), 2711(2).
203. See id. § 2701 (unauthorized access ECS provision); id. § 2702(a)(1) (ECS
voluntary disclosure provision); id. § 2703(a) (ECS compelled disclosure provision).
204. Id. § 2702(a)(2) (RCS voluntary disclosure provision); id. § 2703(b) (RCS
compelled disclosure provision); id. § 2711(2) (RCS definition).
205. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress
focused the SCA on a function rather than on technology to avoid frequent
revisions).
206. See House ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 474 (indicating that the SCA
has been able to mold new technologies because it focuses on function rather
than technology).
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in the Act.207 Second, if the communication is in regular “computer
storage,” it may be protected under the RCS provisions.208 Third,
those communications that do not lie within the preceding two
categories fall outside of the SCA altogether.209
Moreover, this framework better comports with congressional
intent. Unlike the providers in 1986, most modern providers supply
ECS and RCS services interchangeably.210 For this reason, courts have
had trouble categorizing newer services such as social networking
websites pursuant to the SCA’s framework.211 Adopting a “function”
approach, as envisioned by Congress, eliminates this confusion by
creating a simple process: analyze the communication involved and
determine whether the communication is in “electronic storage” or
“computer storage,” irrespective of the type of provider. Once this is
determined, the communication necessarily falls into either the ECS
or RCS category or outside the SCA altogether.
Finally, by focusing on the information sought and the function of
the communication, this interpretation answers the uncertainties left
by Quon.
Adopting Quon’s “all or nothing” approach would
undermine the statutory scheme and fail to take into account the
entire statute by focusing solely on the class of provider without
accounting for the fact that ISPs provide both ECS and RCS services.212
This “all or nothing” approach also creates holes in the electronic
storage definition.
Applying Quon’s reasoning, a court could

207. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2703(a) (2012).
208. Id. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2703(b); see supra notes 105–110 and accompanying text
(noting legislative history suggesting that an ECS provider becomes an RCS provider
once an email is stored on a remote server indefinitely). Apart from qualifying as an
RCS provider pursuant to the RCS definition, an RCS provider must further satisfy
two requirements to enjoy the RCS privacy protections. The communications must
be “carried or maintained” by the RCS “solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services.” Id. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2703(b)(2)(B). Moreover, the
RCS cannot be “authorized to access the contents of any such communications for
purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing.” Id.
§§ 2702(a)(2)(B), 2703(b)(2)(B).
209. This third category encompasses both communications in electronic storage
stored for more than 180 days and communications stored by RCS providers that do
not meet requirements imposed on RCS providers. See Robison, supra note 32, at
1212–23 (discussing reasons why “cloud computing” services may not qualify as RCS).
210. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 48, at 120 (asserting that the either RCS or ECS
approach contravenes the SCA’s language and legislative history and noting that
nothing prevents service providers from offering customers both ECS and RCS).
211. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding that subpoenas on Facebook and MySpace seeking private
messaging were quashed under the SCA). The court could not determine whether
the subpoenas seeking Facebook wall posting and MySpace comments could be
quashed under the SCA because of insufficient evidence. Id.
212. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that Quon’s approach has
received considerable criticism from courts).
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conclude that a modern-day provider such as Facebook
predominately provides RCS services via storage of its wall posts,
despite Facebook’s “messaging” feature, which highly resembles an
ECS service.213 This rigid “provider-specific” interpretation would
unnecessarily restrict the SCA’s scope and deprive Facebook
communications of the protections afforded to communications held
by the ECS provider in electronic storage. On the other hand, the
function-specific approach would focus on the particular
communication—wall post or message—rather than categorize
Facebook as RCS or ECS for all communications based on its
predominant use. Consequently, it allows a court to analyze
providers’ services separately with respect to the particular
communication, thereby removing the importance on the type of
technology or provider used.
IV. APPLYING THE SCA TO MODERN TECHNOLOGY
A. An Email Stored on a Server After It Has Been Opened Is Not in
“Electronic Storage”
Equipped with the simpler analysis identified in Part III.B, courts
can apply the current formulation of the SCA to modern technology.
Notably, even if Congress enacts S. 607 in its current form, this
analysis would remain unchanged with regard to a § 2701 inquiry.214
The only questions become: what is electronic storage, and how does
it differ from regular computer storage? According to a House
Report, email is in electronic storage while it is awaiting retrieval by
its intended recipient (Phase I).215 Once the user opens the email
and decides to store that information indefinitely on the provider’s

213. Compare Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (holding that Facebook messages that
were analogous to email communications qualified as ECS services, but also finding
that the same service provider was an RCS with respect to wall postings that were
stored on the server and available to the public), with Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a cell phone provider
was an ECS with regard to archived text messages because it predominately provided
the ability to send and receive electronic communications), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
214. See supra note 177–180 and accompanying text (showing the implications of
S. 607’s failure to address the electronic storage definition). Congress’s failure to
amend the electronic storage definition could lend even more credence to the
argument that post-transmission emails are not in electronic storage for purposes of
§ 2701. See infra notes 242–247 and accompanying text.
215. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 63 (1986) (stating that an electronic mail service
that allows a user to send a message to the recipient’s server “where it is held in
storage until the [recipient] requests it” is subject to § 2701).
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server (Phase II), the email falls out of the “electronic storage”
provision and the provider becomes an RCS provider.216
Congress’s intent to kick the ECS provider outside of the ECS
protections once Phase II begins evidences the “electronic storage”
versus “computer storage” distinction.217 During Phase I, the email
provider is providing services similar to early email systems. On the
other hand, Phase II more closely resembles regular “computer
storage” analogous to hospital and physician records and, for this
reason, falls outside of the ECS category.218
This phased analysis comports with the narrow concept of
“electronic storage” adopted under the SCA in light of the
technology and electronic mail system of 1986 and Congress’s policy
objectives in enacting the statute.219 The distinction between opened
and unopened email, which seem arbitrary to modern-day users,
The
starts to make sense when analyzed under this lens.220
“electronic storage” definition addresses the two primary privacy
concerns from 1986; those of unauthorized access (1) of a message
on the ISP’s servers, awaiting retrieval by its recipient,221 and (2) to
copies of messages that service providers often stored for
approximately three months to ensure “system integrity.”222 In light
of this understanding, whether a communication falls under the
backup provision is determined through the perspective of the ISP,
rather than the user.223 By stating that the backup must be stored by
an ECS for purposes of backup protection, the statutory language in
the backup provision itself suggests that it requires a more affirmative
act on behalf of the service provider than simply providing a service
allowing users to store their emails online.224
216. Cf. id. (noting that once the voicemail user requests and receives the message
and decides to store it, it is protected under the voluntary disclosure provisions and
not § 2701, which requires the communication to be in electronic storage).
217. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 62, 65.
218. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986) (explaining that services that create electronic
copies for later reference and are subject to the control of a third party computer
operator, such as hospital medical files and providers of electronic mail, are not
entitled to ECS protection).
219. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting three important principles
guiding legislative intent in drafting the SCA).
220. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing early email networks that
automatically deleted messages from remote servers once a user downloaded the
message, but noting that service providers often kept a copy for administrative
purposes).
221. See 132 CONG. REC. 27,635 (1986) (declaring that the SCA provides
protections for unauthorized access to messages “stored for later forwarding” by the
electronic mail company).
222. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B) (2012).
224. See id.; see also Jennings v. Jennings, No. 07-CP-40-1125, 2008 WL 8185934
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Moreover, this interpretation complies with Congress’s intent to
provide tiered levels of protection based on when it deemed a user
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.225 The SCA accords the
highest protection to an email that is on the electronic mail server
waiting for the recipient to retrieve it because the user reasonably
expects that the email has similar protections to postal mail.226
Similarly, while the email is in transit, the user does not reasonably
expect the service provider to access the email or create any copies.227
Therefore, backup copies that the service provider creates for
administrative purposes are also afforded the Act’s highest
protections for 180 days228—the longest amount of time Congress
thought that ISPs would possibly store these copies.229 On the other
hand, once the email reaches its recipient, the user’s reasonable
expectation of privacy diminishes in accordance with 1986
technology. In 1986, users did not have an option to store email on
the web; rather, emails were either downloaded onto a personal
computer or discarded.230 For this reason, Congress did not believe
that post-transmission emails stored on a server qualified as
“electronic storage.”

(S.C.C.P. Sept. 23, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 697 S.E.2d 671 (S.C. Ct. App.
2010), rev’d, 736 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133
S. Ct. 1806 (2013); OTA REPORT, supra note 19, at 45–46 (indicating that electronic
communications were vulnerable “when retained in the files of the electronic mail
company for administrative purposes”).
225. See 132 CONG. REC. 27,635 (statement of Sen. Mathias) (stating that the Act
extends protections to certain electronic communications but exempts media that
does not carry with it an expectation of privacy); see also supra text accompanying
notes 45–53 (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
226. See House ECPA Hearing, supra note 20, at 2 (statement of Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice) (stating that electronic mail messages were the “new technological
equivalents of telephone calls, telegrams, and mail”); 131 CONG. REC. 24,366 (1985)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (asserting that Americans should feel just as confident in
sending electronic messages as they are in putting mail in a mailbox).
227. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 & n.34 (1986) (stating that, while the service
provider had access to the message in case of system failure, the service provider did
not normally access the messages and analogizing a user’s expectation in sending an
email with that of someone sending postal mail).
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (requiring a warrant for communications in
electronic storage held by an ECS for 180 days or less). Just as the U.S. Postal Service
may not divulge an individual’s mail, neither could an electronic mail company. See
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
229. S. REP. NO. 113-34, at 2 (2013) (“[In 1986,] Congress believed that the most
extended period of time that a service provider might store an email would be for six
months.”).
230. S. REP. NO. 112-258, at 4 (2012) (“At the time that Congress enacted the
ECPA, Congress assumed that most Americans would periodically access their email
accounts and download any emails that they wished to read, and that third-party
service providers would subsequently delete any email stored on their servers.”).
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Moreover, the statutory text mandates that a court take into
account the temporary, intermediate provision and the backup
provision in determining whether an electronic communication is
sought. As Chief Justice Toal noted in Jennings, by using the
conjunction “and,” Congress intended that the communications
referred to in the backup provision be copies of those
communications in the temporary, intermediate storage provision.231
The Theofel court found that this interpretation would render the
temporary, intermediate storage provision meaningless because every
backup of a message in intermediate storage would be temporary.232
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to properly analyze the legislative
history of the Act.233 Therefore, Theofel incorrectly rejected the
government’s interpretation of electronic storage.
In passing the SCA, Congress was concerned with closing a
loophole created by the temporary, intermediate storage provision
that left service providers’ backup copies vulnerable to unauthorized
access. Under the temporary, intermediate storage provision, the
government could compel a service provider to provide backup
copies that it generated because the backup copy itself would not
accompany the transmission of the email.234 Therefore, contrary to
Theofel’s reasoning, properly construing “and” to encompass both
provisions of the electronic storage definition does not render the
temporary, intermediate provision superfluous. In fact, the opposite
is true. Adopting Theofel’s broad holding, which suggests that
indefinitely stored communications fall within the electronic storage
definition, renders the temporary, intermediate storage provision of
the definition unnecessary.235
Accordingly, the proper
interpretation of the electronic storage definition is that it
encompasses both temporary, intermediate communications
incidental to transmission and backups of those communications
created by the service provider.236
231. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). In other words, the “backup” copies
must be copies of the “temporary, intermediate storage” referred to in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17)(A).
232. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004).
233. See id. at 1070–71 (noting that the legislative history provided by the
government had little probative value to the case at hand).
234. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1217 n.61 (explaining that the backup provision
ensures that backup copies created by service providers “of unopened e-mails are
protected by the ECS rules even though they are not themselves incident to
transmission”).
235. Bellia, supra note 191, at 1422.
236. See e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (invoking the “cardinal
principle of statutory construction” that a statute should be “so construed that, if it
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B. Why the Jennings Court’s Conclusion Was Right
Applying the simplified process espoused in Part III.B and the
conclusion in Part IV.A. to Jennings indicates that Mr. Jennings’s
stored emails did not qualify as “backup” storage under the SCA’s
“electronic storage” definition. His emails had already reached their
intended recipient and were stored on Yahoo!’s server indefinitely.237
There is no indication that they were stored by or for the provider.
Rather, Mr. Jennings had complete authority over whether the emails
remained on the server.238 Therefore, the Jennings court reached the
correct conclusion. Unfortunately, the court’s fragmented reasoning
undermined the opinion by providing little guidance to courts
attempting to apply its precedent or adopt its reasoning.
Applying the simplified analysis in Part III.B. to Jennings illustrates
how the approach remedies many of the problems faced by courts
currently interpreting the SCA. First, the information soughtMr.
Jennings’s stored emails after they reached their intended
recipientshould be analyzed without regard to the type of provider
to determine whether the information is in electronic storage or
computer storage. Because, as previously determined, Mr. Jennings’s
emails were not in electronic storage, they must have been in regular
computer storage. Thus, his emails fell into the RCS category.239 On
the other hand, if a court had concluded that Mr. Jennings’s emails
were in electronic storage, they would have fallen within the ECS
provisions, providing protection as long as they were stored for less
than 180 days. In that case, Mr. Jennings would have had a cause of
action under § 2701. However, since his emails were not in
electronic storage when Ms. Broome accessed them, he could not
avail himself of § 2701 protection.
Interestingly, the application of the SCA to Jennings under this
proposed, simplified approach could remain unchanged even if
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or
insignificant” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
237. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 248 (S.C. 2012) (Toal, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
238. See id. at 245 (majority opinion). Because Mr. Jennings had not downloaded
or saved another copy of his emails in another location, the court held that he did
not create a “backup” copy and was therefore in full control of whether the email
remained on another server. Id.
239. The RCS provisions have a number of other requirements for service
providers. See supra note 208 (discussing additional requirements for RCS providers
to qualify for protection). These restrictions could make modern webmail services
that employ targeted advertising fall outside the RCS provisions. See Robison, supra
note 32, at 1212–23 (explaining the prerequisites an RCS must satisfy and the
implications of targeted advertising on customer data protection). However, that
topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
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Congress enacts an amendment to the SCA. All current legislative
proposals, including S. 607, which some suggest is likely to pass this
legislative session,240 fail to address § 2701 or any of the definitions
that affect it.241 In fact, Congress’s approach in S. 607 may lend even
more support to the conclusion that post-transmission emails do not
qualify as electronic storage.
Congress’s attempt to require a uniform warrant requirement by
adding language to the compelled disclosure requirement, but not
changing the electronic storage definition, creates a statute that uses
the term electronic storage by itself in § 2701242 and then expands the
application of electronic storage to § 2703(a)’s compelled disclosure
provision.243 Invoking the well-established canons of construction
that “courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render
language superfluous”244 and that Congress is presumed to be “aware
of existing law when it passes legislation,”245 courts will likely find that
“post-transmission” electronic communications are not protected
under § 2701.
Finding otherwise would render the language
following electronic storage in the “new” § 2703(a) meaningless,
since that language specifically states that the compelled disclosure
provision extends to post-transmission content.246
Moreover,
Congress affirmatively chose not to amend the electronic storage
definition and declined to include language extending the scope of
§ 2701, despite the well-known controversy surrounding electronic
storage and post-transmission emails.247 For these reasons, it is very
240. Cannon, supra note 154 (quoting Representative Joe Barton as stating that S.
607 has “a really good chance” of passing).
241. See supra notes 176–182 and accompanying text (discussing suggested reforms
of § 2701).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (delineating the offense and punishment for
unlawful access only to communications in electronic storage held by an ECS
provider).
243. S. 607, 113th Cong. § 3(a) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr.
25, 2013) (including electronic communications in “electronic storage with or
otherwise stored, held, or maintained by” an ECS or RCS provider).
244. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
245. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
246. See e.g., United States v. Koh, 199 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1999) (declining to
adopt the appellee’s interpretation of a statute because doing so would make the
addition of certain language referring to specific branches and agencies superfluous
if Congress had intended the statute to be limited to institutions already covered by
the statute).
247. See e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (reasoning
that a section of the statute that included a longer phrase “jurisdiction to render
judgment” did not apply to a nearby section which spoke only of “jurisdiction”
because courts generally assume that Congress acted intentionally “where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another”
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); In re Application of the
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 621 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2013) (looking at
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likely that if S. 607 is passed in its current version, individuals like Mr.
Jennings would not be entitled to an action under § 2701 for
unauthorized acquisition of post-transmission emails.
CONCLUSION
Congress’s foresight in enacting the SCA has allowed the Act to
adapt to a number of new technologies surprisingly well in the
twenty-seven years since its enactment. However, many now argue
that technology has outpaced the Act’s structure and underlying
assumptions. Currently, the success of an action under the SCA is
necessarily tied to geography due to courts around the country ruling
in different ways. Moreover, individuals, service providers, and the
government are uncertain of their rights and responsibilities. For
this reason, a clear and consistent framework is necessary. An
amendment that updates the SCA by creating a technologically
neutral statute that simplifies the current structure of the SCA, and its
basis on archaic technology, is critical to ensure the continued
progress of technology.
However, until Congress updates the SCA, courts must effectuate
Congress’s intent by categorizing modern technology within the
language of the current statute. Courts must carefully avoid injecting
their own language. By focusing on the function of ISPs with regard
to the particular communication in question, a simple framework
emerges that allows courts to apply the SCA to modern technologies
and addresses the concerns that prompted Congress to adopt the
SCA. Only then can courts be sure that Congress’s intent is properly
carried out.

the language of a related section of a statute that provided for mandatory issuance of
surveillance orders to determine whether the other part of the statute that contained
different language mandated an order).

